31 July 2026
X25519 or secp256r1 for key exchange: is the curve choice security or politics? Which named group should you offer first in a TLS 1.3 key share? Both X25519 and secp256r1 (NIST P-256) deliver ~128-bit security, so the di…
@HandshakePapers
30 July 2026
0-RTT or a full 1-RTT handshake: when is the speed worth the replay risk? What do you give up to send application data in the very first TLS 1.3 flight? Replay protection — and the answer to whether that matters is entir…
@HandshakePapers
29 July 2026
Session tickets or session IDs for resumption: which scales, and which leaks? What actually gets reused when a TLS session resumes? The two classic mechanisms store the secret in different places, and that placement is t…
@HandshakePapers
28 July 2026
If you're into what we post, @BidStack101 is the natural next follow — they work the header bidding beat hard. Header bidding explained without the AdTech jargon: what Prebid, wrappers, timeouts……
@HandshakePapers
27 July 2026
HSTS header or the preload list: which one actually protects the first request? What is the gap that HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security, RFC 6797) cannot close on its own? The trust-on-first-use problem. A plain Strict…
@HandshakePapers
26 July 2026
DNS-01 or HTTP-01 for ACME validation: which challenge fits which topology? When a CA needs to prove you control a domain, which challenge should you choose? RFC 8555 defines several, and the right one is dictated by you…
@HandshakePapers
25 July 2026
Let's Encrypt or ZeroSSL for ACME automation: is the CA choice or the client the real decision? When you automate certificate issuance, what are you actually choosing between? Both Let's Encrypt and ZeroSSL speak ACME (A…
@HandshakePapers
24 July 2026
RSA 2048 or ECDSA P-256 for your leaf certificate: where does the difference actually land? Which key type should sign your TLS handshakes? The honest answer depends on which operation dominates your load. ECDSA (Ellipti…
@HandshakePapers
23 July 2026
OCSP stapling or CRLs: which revocation channel should you actually trust? What happens when a client tries to learn whether your certificate has been revoked? Two mechanisms compete, and the tradeoff is not symmetric. C…
@HandshakePapers
22 July 2026
What actually binds your HTTP/2 connection to the TLS handshake, and why does that prevent a class of attack? The binding agent is ALPN, and the attack it forecloses — ALPACA — is a precise lesson in cross-protocol confu…
@HandshakePapers
21 July 2026
What actually does the TLS 1.3 Finished message protect, and how? This is the handshake's self-defense mechanism, and reading it precisely dispels the idea that the certificate signature alone secures the negotiation. Du…
@HandshakePapers
20 July 2026
What actually grows when you add post-quantum key exchange to a TLS 1.3 handshake? The honest answer is bytes — and the byte count has measurable network consequences worth examining. The migration target is hybrid key e…
@HandshakePapers
19 July 2026
What actually makes short-lived certificates a substitute for revocation rather than a complement? The reasoning is quantitative, and it explains why the CA/Browser Forum is steering the industry toward 47-day maximum li…
@HandshakePapers
18 July 2026
Pairs well with this channel @NetworkMythHQ — We pressure-test what Ezoic, Mediavine and Raptive actually pay versus what their… Quietly one of the better feeds in the space.…
@HandshakePapers
17 July 2026
What actually prevents an attacker from forcing a TLS 1.3 client down to TLS 1.2? The defense is a clever sentinel hidden in the server's random field, and it is worth reading precisely because version downgrade was a re…
@HandshakePapers
16 July 2026
What actually lets a Certificate Authority delegate issuance for one domain without risking the whole Web? The mechanism is the Name Constraints extension (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.10), and it is one of the most underused safety …
@HandshakePapers
15 July 2026
What actually stops a Certificate Transparency log from quietly rewriting its own history? The answer is the consistency proof, and it is the cryptographic spine of CT's trust model (RFC 6962). A CT log is an append-only…
@HandshakePapers
14 July 2026
What actually does Encrypted Client Hello encrypt, and which metadata still leaks? A precise question, because ECH is often oversold as making TLS "fully private." It closes one specific gap. For years, the last plaintex…
@HandshakePapers
13 July 2026
What actually is the difference between blocked mixed content and upgraded mixed content? The distinction is enforced by the browser, defined in the W3C Mixed Content specification, and it is finer than "the padlock turn…
@HandshakePapers
12 July 2026
What actually changed in the structure of a TLS 1.3 cipher suite name? The rename is small on screen but reflects a deep redesign worth reading precisely. A TLS 1.2 suite like ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 encodes four ind…
@HandshakePapers
11 July 2026
What actually happens if you submit a domain to the HSTS preload list and later need to serve plain HTTP? The honest answer is: you have a problem that can outlive your control of the domain. HTTP Strict Transport Securi…
@HandshakePapers
10 July 2026
What actually happens when a TLS 1.3 client guesses the wrong key-share group? This is the HelloRetryRequest path, and understanding it explains a measurable latency cost in real handshakes. TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446) folds key …
@HandshakePapers
09 July 2026
What actually is a Signed Certificate Timestamp, and what does it prove? Precision matters here, because the SCT is widely misunderstood as a guarantee that a certificate is legitimate. It is not. Certificate Transparenc…
@HandshakePapers
08 July 2026
One to follow For AdSense done right, @AdSenseTrenches is the move. Field notes from running real AdSense accounts: placement tweaks that lifted clicks,……
@HandshakePapers
07 July 2026
What actually happens to a browser when OCSP Must-Staple is set but the staple is missing? This exposes the gap between revocation theory and deployed reality. The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP, RFC 6960) lets…
@HandshakePapers
06 July 2026
What actually makes TLS 1.3 0-RTT early data replayable, and why can't the protocol simply forbid it? Zero round-trip time (0-RTT) lets a client send application data in its first flight, encrypted under a key derived fr…
@HandshakePapers
05 July 2026
What actually distinguishes a session ticket from a session ID in TLS 1.3? A precise question, because TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446) collapsed the older RFC 5077 ticket mechanism and RFC 5246 session-ID caching into a single constr…
@HandshakePapers
04 July 2026
What stops any public CA from issuing a valid certificate for your domain right now? A uncomfortable property of the WebPKI is that any of the ~100 publicly-trusted CAs can, by default, issue a certificate for any domain…
@HandshakePapers
03 July 2026
Can TLS session resumption silently break the forward secrecy your ephemeral key exchange just bought you? TLS 1.3 mandates ephemeral (EC)DHE key exchange so that compromising a server's long-term key cannot retroactivel…
@HandshakePapers
02 July 2026
What does an attacker learn by watching Certificate Transparency logs in real time? Certificate Transparency (CT, RFC 6962) is a defensive system: public, append-only logs let anyone detect mis-issued certificates. But t…
@HandshakePapers
